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Economic globalization has always required ideological legitimation. 
In the first instance this legitimation was explicitly theological; today 
in Roman Catholic circles, it continues to be. The first modern 
legitimations of what would become economic globalization were 
made upon the universalist bases of the "law of nations," a derivation 
from "natura/law" as it was conceptualized in the 13th century by 
Thomas Aquinas and interpreted by his I 6th century Scholastic 
successors, the Spanish Dominican and Jesuit jurists of the so-called 
School of Salamanca. The work of the Spanish was both continued a 
century later, and adapted to Protestant theological exigencies, by the 
Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, and others. These early, theologically 
informed justifications of economic globalization are the bases for 
what has come to be known as "the law of nations" and hence our 
traditions of international law. Even today under conditions of so-
called secularization of international law, legitimations of 
globalization retain traces of reliance on natura/law, and thus to 
their original religious bases. 
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In the broadest of senses, 'globalization' can be seen as a process or series of 
processes effecting worldwide linkages, joint action and the formation and 
maintenance of transnational institutions, made possible by recent advances in 
electronic communications and high-speed international travel, such as IGOs -
inter-governmental organizations - like IMF, OPEC, WTO, NAFTA, EEU, 
ASEAN, UN, EEU, NATO, World Court- and arguably world politico-religious 
movements like AI Qa'ida. Likewise, we can list cultural and social trends, such as 
English as the language of business, commerce and travel, transnational migration 
and missionizing, world fashions in music, art, design, cyberspace as a global 
domain, and finally, the many NGOs - non-governmental organizations of 
worldwide relief and humanitarian organizations Red Cross/Crescent, Save the 
Rain Forests, Greenpeace, Oxfam, Medecins sans Frontieres, Amnesty 
International and so on. This paper is limited to the subject of economic 
globalization, and its relation to religion. 
As far as economic globalization and religion are concerned, I shall argue 
that the main principles behind the high-tech modern phenomenon of economic 
globalization is a religious history. Dating to the beginnings of Western mercantile 
capitalism from as early as the 161h century in the beginnings of Western 
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expansion, colonialism and world domination, religion played a key role in the 
legitimation of what we now recognize as economic globalization. (Sklair, 1999: 
144, and 156-9) In this sense, while our contemporary forms of economic 
globalization may be unique in terms of their technologies, they are centuries old 
in terms of their principles of legitimacy. (Beyer, 1994: I; Padgett, 2002) Thus, 
although economic globalization represents a great quantitative change in world 
economic (and other) conditions, it is not as a qualitatively new phenomenon, 
since it is just capitalism taken to its 'natural' and full extent, much as Immanuel 
Wallerstein has famously argued. (Wallerstein, 197 4) In accepting Wallerstein's 
chronology of the rise of a global world economic system- 1450-1670- I am thus 
committed to produce evidence of religious legitimations of early capitalism for 
this period. The bulk of this paper devotes itself to exploring the critical 
theological moves legitimating economic globalization of the 16th and 17th 
centuries in the West, primarily in Spain and the Netherlands. 
"Law", International Law, Natural Law and Religion 
In speaking of legitimating so robust a process as economic globalization, it 
would seem that much more than religious forces, understood as moral forces or 
theological argument, would be required. Economic globalization would seem to 
demand state power and its key legitimating agencies- one of which, for example, 
would be the law. Further, since economic globalization essentially occupies the 
international arena, the most pertinent domain of law would be international law 
or the 'law of nations.' Where is religion in that? As I shall show, there is 
abundant religion in that, primarily arising first out of neo-Thomist attempts to 
apply natural law or the law of nature to legitimate and regulate political and 
economic activity in the period of early capitalism. 
A small symptom of this theological heritage is how globalization is often 
thought to be "natural" -what everyone 'naturally' desires. How did we get to this 
place? In behalf of what root values has economic globalization committed us? As 
a matter of intellectual history, what were the debates over the principles that made 
economic globalization a practical possibility, and if these debates invoked 
religious arguments and sanctions, what were they, and who were the participants? 
I believe that students of religion have overlooked the religious intellectual and 
institutional features that make globalization possible or legitimate, as far as it is -
that makes what is itself a human construct pass as something of nature, something 
given. 
Looked at as a matter of the history of religion, economic globalization 
required certain /ega/legitimations, and these /ega/legitimations were, in the first 
instance (and in Roman Catholic circles at least continue to be), theological. These 
early religious legitimations were made in turn upon the universalist bases of the 
law of nations, a derivation from 'natural law' as it was conceptualized in the 13th 
century by Thomas Aquinas and by his 16th century Scholastic successors, the 
Spanish Dominican and Jesuit jurists who articulated early formulations of the law 
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of nations. And, while it is true that these original legitimations were made on 
behalf of either a Spanish or Portuguese imperium, the logic of these legitimating 
strategies made the hegemonic practices of imperium harder to sustain by 
argument. Freedom once asserted becomes, in logic, freedom for all, and not just 
for the. imperium. This weakness in Iberian logic will be exploited by Grotius, as 
we will see. Furthermore, later, even under conditions of so-called secularization 
of the law of nations and international law that followed, legitimations. of 
globalization retain traces of reliance on natural law, and thus to their original 
religious bases. · 
Let me at least try to sketch out the main lines of this story here, by touching 
on main authors and works that are considered high points of the discourse of the 
law of nations, and thus, according to my claim, main figures in the legitimation of 
economic globalization. 
With Portuguese and Spanish 'discoveries' of the New World, Western 
European society was flooded with masses of new data about human cultures 
heretofore unknown. Attempts at understanding saw Westerners trying to fit the 
peoples and civilizations of the New World into pre-existing templates provided 
by examples of the then known world of the Mediterranean and Muslim cultures or 
from textual authorities such as the bible or the Western classics. These efforts 
soon enough were abandoned, to be replaced by what have become in time our 
own modern comparative ethnographic social and cultural sciences. (Pagden, 
1982) . 
More perhaps than a venue of comparative thinking, the New World became 
the site of competitive commerce and colonial expansion. Spain and Portugal were 
burdened with the need to demonstrate the legitimacy of their claims of dominion 
before the Papacy and the nations of Christian Europe (Pagden, 1990: 13f). 
Prodded then by the need to justify their policies in the New World, the Spanish in 
particular, undertook a project of legal reasoning about the status of the 'others' of 
the New World. Were their societies really proper societies or were they more like 
animal packs, and thus prime targets for employment as 'beasts' of burden, slaves? 
Were their 'religions' really 'religions' or just magic or demonic rites? Did the 
Indians enjoy legitimate dominion over the territory that they occupied? Was an 
Indian 'king' a real 'king,' and therefore was rebellion against him just? Did native 
governance over their territory conform to principles of natural law, or did they 
deviate from divinely inscribed rules, such as seemed the case with human 
sacrifice in the New World? Under what conditions could the Spanish make war 
and exert .their own dominion over the native folk of the New World, and still 
conform their behavior to the highest principles of the natural law, divinely 
inscribed into the human soul? Were the Indians human beings in the full sense of 
the term? Questions such as these were put to a rigorous system of debate in the 
traditional manner of the medieval Schoolmen in great Spanish universities, such 
as Salamanca. (Pagden, 1988; Pagden, 1990: ch. 1) Notable among the prominent 
theologians who challenged the designs of the Spanish crown were members of the 
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so-called School of Salamanca, chief among whom were, the Dominican 
academic, Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1485-1546), his Jesuit compatriot of a century 
later, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), and the most famous among their number, 
Bartolome de las Casas (1484-1576). Even though these attempts to regulate 
crown policy by way of law were frequently ignored by the settlers in New Spain, 
the results of these debates formed what Anthony Pagden calls. "an important part 
of the ideological armature" of the Spanish crown, and thus in their own way, 
Pagden at least, believes they made a difference at least for a while (Pagden, 1990: 
5 and 25). 
For our purposes, prominent among the arguments of the Salamanca 
Schoolmen were some of the first modern legal opinions governing international 
commerce and trade. (Pagden, 1990) Francisco de Vitoria, for example, affirmed it 
as part of natural law that the Spaniards had 'natural' rights to travel without 
restriction among the Indians, to trade with them, to import Spanish goods and to 
export surplus commodities, such as gold and silver, likewise to explore and mine 
precious metals on Indian lands (Nussbaum, 1954: 81; Vitoria, 1991: 278-84). All 
these rights rested on the assumption of the natural sociability and desire for 
communication of the human species. On the natural right of all peoples to free 
passage, Vitoria appeals to the paramount- but as we will see problematic - value 
of sociability and community. (Pagden, 1990: 21 ): 
Amongst all nations it is considered inhuman to treat strangers and travelers 
badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to behave hospitably 
to strangers. This would not be the case if travelers were doing something 
evil by visiting foreign nations. Second, the beginning of the world, when 
all things were held in common, everyone was allowed to visit and travel 
through any land he wished. This right was clearly not taken away by the 
division of property ( diuisio rerum); it was never the intention of nations to 
prevent men's free mutual intercourse with one another by this division. 
(Vitoria, 1991: 278) 
This seemingly humane declaration takes a coercive turn, however, when one 
realizes that it trumps anything one might call individual rights. The Indians, for 
example, legally were deprived of the right to 'close their doors' to their 
(uninvited) Spanish 'guests.' By dint of natural law principles, failure to yield to 
this right of free passage justified exacting sanctions. The Spaniards interpreted the 
natural right of sociability to entail that native folk were required to love the 
Spaniards and to permit them to further their interests, both material and religious, 
just as the gospel enjoined Christians to love their neighbors as themselves? Not 
to do so, infringed upon natural law, thus granting the aggrieved party to wage 
"just war" in response to this rebuff to sociability. (Pagden, 1990: 22) Indians 
could likewise not deny exercises of the natural rights to free passage by the 
Spaniards. Denial of free passage ipso facto constituted a casus belli against the 
Indians as offenders against natural law, with the consequent potential for 
surrender of Indian dominion to the Spanish. ,Qther aspects of the application and 
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conception of the law of nations by the Spaniards are similarly double-edged. As a 
contemporary of the celebrated Bartolome de las Casas (1484-1576), for example, 
Vitoria defended Las Casas' criticism of the vicious economic exploitation by the 
Spaniards against of the native inhabitants of the New World (Nussbaum, 1954: 
79; Pagden, 1991; Todorov, 1999). Yet, Vitoria was generally comfortable 
~ defending Spanish national colonial interests in the New World. He opposed some 
reasons for the Spaniards making "just" war against the New World Indians, but 
approved others. Nor did symmetry seem to have figured much in the working out 
of this kind of legal thinking: other European powers were not granted free 
passage and access to Iberian markets and resources! 
Whatever the moral and humane merits of this sort of jurisprudence and its 
workings out, prominent international lawyers have pointed to these Spanish 
theologians as founders of international law, the so-called "law of nations" (Rossi, 
1998; Scott, 1934). And, although a case can also be made on behalf of the Dutch 
Protestant thinker, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), as a stronger candidate for the title 
of founder of the international law or the law of nations, the Spanish theologians 
are not to be dismissed (Nussbaum, 1954: 296-306). After all, Grotius himself 
frequently notes, that the great Dutch legal thinker was deeply indebted to the 
Spaniards (Grotius, 1916:4,9, 14, and 18). 
From Grotius to George W. Bush 
Spanish efforts to articulate the terms and principles of the law of nations -
were soon followed by the efforts of legal scholars from competing European 
Protestant powers. While the results of the work of the Protestant scholars will 
differ in key respects - in particular in terms of their assertion of the rights of the 
individual - they nonetheless continue much of the thrust of the Spanish 
Scholastics, especially Hugo Grotius, the most widely read and esteemed of all 
Renaissance masters ofthe law of nations. 
Grotius is known primarily for his treatises on just war and freedom of 
passage on the high seas. Tending toward a Protestant individualism as much as 
the Catholic Spaniards favored sociability and communication, Grotius is more 
concerned with the "simple principles of security," such as embodied in our right 
of personal self-defense. While Grotius does not deny the value of sociability, the 
right of individual self-defense trumps it, largely because society is derived from 
the individual will (Pagden, 2002: 8-9). For Catholics like Vitoria and his fellows, 
society is a natural divine institution; the individual is a construct. For Grotius 
things are the other way round (Pagden, 2002: 9). Nicely capturing this individual 
ground of a common human nature, Grotius says that God has given people "the 
same origin, the same structural organism, the ability to look each other in the 
face ... and recognize their natural social bond and kinship" - all done individually 
by the individual (Grotius, 1916: 2). 
Despite different first principles, Grotius accepts natural law, although he 
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prefers a secular conception of it. While he never denies the central Scholastic 
theological conception of natural law, he argued that even if God did not exist, 
natural law would still be compelling. Much else that Grotius asserts links him to 
the Scholastics. In his 1608 The Freedom of the Seas, he affirms with Vitoria the 
universality and 'natural' quality of the law of nations. His arguments for free 
passage over the seas - against Portuguese claims to ownership over the high seas 
-rest on natural law (Grotius 1916). International trade is also natural because, as 
it is self-evident, its conditions are written on nature, so to speak. Grotius could 
then affirm with Vitoria the view that "every nation is free to travel to every other 
nation, and to trade with it ... on the following most specific and unimpeachable 
axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of 
which is self-evident and immutable" (Grotius, 1916: 7). With characteristic 
eloquence Grotius argues: 
God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature; and inasmuch as 
it is not His will to have Nature supply every place with all the necessaries of 
life. He ordains that some nations excel in one art and others in another. Why 
is this His will, except it be that He wished human friendships to be 
engendered by mutual needs and resources, Jest individuals deeming 
themselves entirely sufficient should for that very reason be rendered 
unsociable? So by the decree of divine justice it was brought about that one 
people should supply the needs of another, in order, as Pliny the Roman writer 
said that in this way, whatever has been produced anywhere should seem to 
have been destined for all. (Grotius, 1916: 7) 
The line from Grotius onward could be extended in great detail by including 
such figures as Immanuel Kant or Kant's contemporary, the rationalist 
philosopher, Christian Wolff and the latter's leading interpreter, the Swiss, Emeric 
de Vattel (1714-1767). For present purposes, I can only sketch the barest outlines 
of this evolution by pointing to Vattel's great work, The Law of Nations or The 
Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations 
and of Sovereigns (Vattel, 1758). It was introduced from Europe to America by 
Benjamin Franklin, and immediately became the main authority in matters of 
international law in the courts, congress and diplomacy of the new republic 
(Lapradelle, 1964: xxv). From the late 18th century, it was widely read as an 
established textbook in American universities, and thus entered into international 
legal thinking in the USA. In a way, this evolution culminated in the Wilsonian 
promotion of international law in the early decades of the 20th century and in the 
foundation of the United Nations. Some might argue that we are now witnessing 
the undoing of this internationalist tradition in, for example, recent American 
conflicts with the Security Council of the United Nations over war in Iraq 
(Lapradelle, 1964: xxx; Rossi, 1998: 143-4). 
To return to my main point about economic globalization, these classic 
authors unanimously support the principle of universal and natural human rights -
with varying degrees of theological motivation and justification. Chief among 
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them for originating and sustaining economic globalization is the right to free 
passage, first articulated by the Dominican jurist Francisco de Vitoria. It is judged 
a fundamental and unquestioned right that people may visit and travel in the lands 
of others, and to perform various acts of trade and commerce across national 
borders. Absent this right and economic globalization cannot be deemed 
legitimate. While it may be true that in "actual state practice 'freedom of 
commerce' was never a rule of law, but at best a principle of commercial policy," 
this right of free passage forms the fundamental basis for the legitimation of the 
perceived universal and natural right to trade across the boundaries of states, and 
thus forms the fundamental legal ground for so-called condition of free trade that 
we call globalization (Nussbaum, 1954: 84). It is, in short, more than any other 
principle, the legitimating idea upon which economic globalization rests. 
Hitting the Hard Hobbesian Ground 
In our own time, no one invokes the tenets of theological and metaphysical 
natural law to justify economic globalization - at least explicitly. Here, politico-
economic positivism and realism dominate the relation between states, much as 
Hobbes and Machiavelli argued. On positivist terms, for example, free passage 
· cannot be assumed, but rather requires the enabling agency of deliberately drawn-
'positive' - legal treaty commitments. Yet, there is evidence that elements of 
natural law sensibility are taken-for-granted as the pre-contractual bases for 
positive treaties themselves. Thus, even for agents of economic globalization like 
an international trading body such as the WTO, it is just assumed that the world 
will be a better place for all if the free passage/free trade policies of economic 
globalization were to be ratified by binding treaties. Quoting from a recent account 
of the mind of the WTO, we read: "The underlying philosophy of the WTO is that 
open markets, nondiscrimination and global competition in international trade are 
conducive to the national welfare of all countries" (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001: 
1 ). 
While the thinking here may be largely prudential and not consciously 
grounded in a priori theological convictions about the divinely inscribed, natural 
teleology of humankind, these remarks are worth another look. Just how corrigible 
is the faith of globalizers, say that "political constraints prevent governments from 
adopting more efficient trade policies, and that through the reciprocal exchange of 
liberalization commitments these political constraints can be overcome" 
(Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001: 1 )? What empirical state of affairs would have to 
apply for the authors of the above statement to alter their view of the 'natural' 
quality of international economic exchange? For some free marketeers, faith in the 
superiority of free markets and economic globalization may not be an empirical 
matter at all, but rather a view that reflects a metaphysics- a religion, if you will-
a symptom of a globalized market 'theology.' 
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In pointing out the cryptic metaphysical character of faith in the essential 
goodness of economic globalization, I am not urging an embrace of classic natural 
law doctrine. No consensus exists, for example, about the content of natural law, 
nor is there likely to be one. Moreover, one will have to overcome the dominance 
of positivism and realism in economic and political matters. Even when a limping 
concept of presumed international law is in play, recent world events point out 
how vulnerable our institutions of international law are. To some, little has 
changed from what Hobbes opined centuries ago - namely that "international law 
is no more than an inane phrase." Nations are simply not bound by legal bonds 
other than those they positively choose to enact and enforce. As H.L.A. Hart has 
argued, the sense of 'law' operative in speaking of the law of nations or 
international law is unlike law in the sense of positively legislated law, such as 
'municipal' or 'national' law. For one thing, the law of nations is not the work of a 
legislature, nor does it have "courts with compulsory jurisdiction and centrally 
organized sanctions" (Hart, 1961: 209). The 'laws' of international law, according 
to Hart, are like the rules of "honor or of fashion," the result of the "'opinions and 
sentiments current among nations in general'," a kind of international common 
code of conduct - more like the "rules of obligation" or customary rules typical 
of a small-scale, tightly knit isolated society (Hart, 1961: 222). This is why, in the 
end, the perceived security and welfare of a nation's citizens executed by the 
nation-state still always trumps international law - even regarding those positive 
contracted treaty obligations entered into with another nation-state (Moynihan, 
1990: 1-6; Nussbaum, 1954: 144-6). 
But, by the same token, in order for there to be 'positive,' contractual 
agreements about trade and commerce, for good or for ill, partners in such 
compacts must already have formed a pre-contractual sense about certain 
desiderata. It is, ironically, precisely in terms of such a pre-contractual 'natural' 
and unspoken sense of what is appropriate that globalizers today press their case 
for open markets. Globalizers thus trade on the unspoken view that it is self-
evidently healthy, in addition to being profitable to those who can work the angles 
of expansive open world markets, that we all assume with them that human 
communication and sociability are 'natural' and unquestioned values. Vitoria and 
Grotius return by the back door, so to speak! What is monstrous in the view of 
globalizers, then and now, are those hermit regimes that seal off their peoples and 
goods at the borders -North Korea being today's prime case in point. To the 
extent, we felt sympathy for such conceptions of human nature, we would join 
chief international law theorists in thinking about the fundamentals of international 
law as having a "universal 'meta-state' character (that) ... 'embraced all peoples of 
all continents' in a set of community beliefs, not merely societal relations" (Rossi, 
1998: 110). 
In this paper, I have resisted taking a position on economic globalization 
itself, but rather have tried to historicize the economic values in terms of their 
origins in the Scholastic and early Renaissance theological and jurisprudential 
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thought of the likes of a Vitoria or a Grotius. (Pagden, 2002: 1) I have historicized 
these economic values inherent in today's economic globalization neither because 
I oppose them or assent to them, but because I seek to understand them. Thus, 
while I personally lean towards the core liberal values of communication, 
sociability, freedom of travel, cosmopolitan openness and such that thinkers like 
Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius promoted, I am not yet prepared to defend 
their compelling qualities very far. I have rather sought to place the rise of the 
values of economic globalization within a series of historical contexts because they 
need to be carefully rethought in light of the actual cultural and economic 
globalization of our planet as other civilizations bring their sometimes contrary 
claims about what is 'natural' before the world for recognition. What I seek to 
provoke then is discussion about why these core liberal economic values of 
communication, sociability, freedom of travel, cosmopolitan openness and such 
should be values for us and others. 
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